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Abstract— Secure QoS routing algorithms are a fundamental part of wireless networks that aim to provide services with QoS 
and security guarantees. In Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs), vehicles perform routing functions, and at the same time act 
as end-systems thus routing control messages are transmitted unprotected over wireless channels. The QoS of the entire 
network could be degraded by an attack on the routing process, and manipulation of the routing control messages. In this paper, 
we propose a novel secure and reliable multi-constrained QoS aware routing algorithm for VANETs. We employ the Ant Colony 
Optimisation (ACO) technique to compute feasible routes in VANETs subject to multiple QoS constraints determined by the data 
traffic type. Moreover, we extend the VANET-oriented Evolving Graph (VoEG) model to perform plausibility checks on the 
routing control messages exchanged among vehicles. Simulation results show that the QoS can be guaranteed while applying 
security mechanisms to ensure a reliable and robust routing service. 
Index Terms— ACO, evolving graph, multi-constrained QoS (MCQ), reliable routing, secure routing, VANETs  
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1 INTRODUCTION
N recent years, development of Vehicular Ad hoc Net-
works (VANETs) has received more attention and re-
search effort from the automotive industries and academ-
ic community [1], [2], [3]. VANETs are a particular form 
of wireless network made by vehicles communicating 
among themselves and with roadside units (RSUs). The 
wireless communications provided by VANETs have 
great potential to facilitate new services that could save 
thousands of lives and improve the driving experience. A 
key requirement for such services is that they are offered 
with Quality of Service (QoS) guarantees in terms of ser-
vice reliability and availability. However, the highly dy-
namic nature of VANETs and their vulnerability to both 
external and internal security attacks raise important 
technical challenges in terms of reliable and secure rout-
ing. These challenges are the subject of this paper.  
QoS routing plays an essential role in identifying 
routes that meet the QoS requirements of the offered ser-
vice over VANETs. However, identifying feasible routes 
in a multi-hop vehicular network subject to multiple QoS 
constraints is a Multi-Constrained (Optimal) Path 
(MC(O)P) problem, which is proven to be NP-hard [4] if 
the constraints are mutually independent [5]. Much work 
has been conducted that addresses QoS routing and the 
MC(O)P problem in stable networks such as Internet and 
wireless sensor networks [6], [7], [8], [9]. Generally, there 
are two distinct approaches adopted to solve MC(O)P 
problems, exact QoS routing algorithms and approxima-
tion routing algorithms. In the exact solutions, different 
strategies have been followed such as nonlinear definition 
of the path length [10], look-ahead feature [11], and k 
shortest paths [12]. Unfortunately, these strategies are not 
suitable for application in highly dynamic networks like 
VANETs. For instance, the look-ahead strategy proposes 
computing the shortest path tree rooted at the destination 
to each node in the network for each of the m link weights 
separately where m is the number of QoS constraints [13]. 
This proposal means that Dijkstra’s algorithm [14] should 
be executed m times. This strategy is not suitable for ap-
plication in VANETs because it adds extra time complexi-
ty to the routing algorithm that is expected to establish 
routes for real time applications. In contrast, approxima-
tion solutions such as swarm intelligence based algo-
rithms display several features that make them particular-
ly suitable for solving MC(O)P problems in VANETs. 
They are fully distributed so there is no single point of 
failure, the operations to be performed at each node are 
simple, they are self-organising, thus robust and fault 
tolerant, and they intrinsically adapt to traffic changes 
without requiring complex mechanisms [15]. Ant Colony 
Optimisation (ACO) is one of the most successful swarm 
intelligence techniques. It has been recognised as an effec-
tive technique for producing results for MC(O)P prob-
lems that are very close to those of the best performing 
algorithms [16]. However, how and in particular to the 
degree which the ACO technique can improve multi-
constrained QoS (MCQ) routing in VANETs as well as 
mitigate security threats against the routing process have 
yet to be addressed. 
To the best of our knowledge, none of the previously 
conducted work on MCQ routing in VANETs considers 
the security of the routing process. In general, attacks on 
the routing process in ad hoc networks aim to increase 
the adversaries control over communication between 
some nodes, degrade the QoS provided by the network, 
and increase the resource consumption of the victim 
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nodes [17]. An adversary’s capacity to mount specific at-
tacks depends on its nature, i.e., external or internal ad-
versary. Due to the fact that vehicles’ communications are 
not usually protected physically and may be controlled 
and compromised by attackers, it can be deduced that 
VANETs can be subject to both internal and external ad-
versaries. Routing control messages are the main target of 
adversaries mounting attacks against the routing process. 
Route disruption, route diversion, and creation of incor-
rect routing states are examples of security attacks that 
can be mounted against the routing process by manipu-
lating the routing control messages [17]. The information 
within the routing control message can be classified into 
mutable and immutable information. Immutable infor-
mation is set by the source node and not changed during 
the routing process, e.g., the source and destination ad-
dresses. In contrast, mutable information is changed at 
each intermediate node to complete the route discovery 
process. Changes in mutable information can be divided 
into traceable changes, e.g., addition of a new intermedi-
ate node identifier, and untraceable changes, e.g., an in-
crease in the hop-count value. Protecting immutable in-
formation is relatively easy by applying a proper security 
mechanism such as digital signatures. However, protect-
ing the mutable and more specifically untraceable muta-
ble information such as hop-count is much harder for two 
reasons. First, intermediate nodes have not yet added 
some of this information, and the number of nodes that 
will contribute to this information cannot be anticipated. 
Second, it is not possible to tell the origin of changes or 
updates to this information simply by looking at its value, 
e.g., a hop-count. 
In this paper, we propose a novel secure ACO-based 
MCQ aware (S-AMCQ) routing algorithm for VANETs. S-
AMCQ aims to identify feasible routes between two vehi-
cles subject to multiple QoS constraints, and provide a 
reliable and robust routing service. The novelty of S-
AMCQ lies in the unique design of its ACO-based algo-
rithm components that considers the topological proper-
ties of VANETs including variable communication link 
quality and frequent link breakages. More specifically, the 
rules of S-AMCQ routing algorithm consider the reliabil-
ity of communication links among vehicles as the most 
important factor while searching for a desired route. Fo-
cusing on the fundamental problem of developing a se-
cure and robust MCQ routing algorithm, the paper makes 
two major contributions. Firstly, we develop S-AMCQ 
routing algorithm that adapts to the characteristics of the 
vehicular network’s topology and computes the optimal 
route, if such a route exists. Secondly, we utilise the 
evolving graph theory and extend the VANET-oriented 
evolving graph (VoEG) model [18] that captures the 
evolving characteristics of the vehicular network topolo-
gy. The extended VoEG (E-VoEG) model represents the 
vehicular network’s current status, and helps to ensure 
consistency of the authenticated received routing control 
messages in S-AMCQ, i.e., it mitigates suspicious behav-
iour or attacks that could be mounted by compromised 
vehicles if any exist. This is accomplished via plausibility 
checks that are developed specifically for S-AMCQ rout-
ing algorithm. To further illustrate the effectiveness of the 
proposed S-AMCQ routing algorithm, we perform simu-
lation experiments that introduce the security information 
overhead into the routing process. Simulation results 
demonstrate that S-AMCQ can guarantee significant per-
formance in terms of QoS guarantees and reliable routing 
service while applying security mechanisms. 
S-AMCQ routing algorithm considers the class of ap-
plications having only a single destination, i.e., unicast 
routing. Traffic related inquiries and general information 
services such as Web surfing, email, etc., are examples of 
such applications. The performance of S-AMCQ routing 
algorithm is examined for a highway scenario where ve-
hicles move at varying velocities and are allowed to stop, 
turn, and leave the highway as in a real world situation. 
Highways are expected to be the main target for the de-
ployment of vehicular communication networks. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 
presents the system assumptions made about the vehicu-
lar network system. Section 3 overviews the related work 
in this field. Section 4 defines the ACO rules developed to 
solve the MC(O)P problem in VANETs. Section 5 presents 
the E-VoEG model. Section 6 proposes S-AMCQ routing 
algorithm and discusses the developed plausibility 
checks. Section 7 assesses the performance of S-AMCQ 
routing algorithm. Finally, section 8 concludes the paper. 
2 SYSTEM ASSUMPTIONS  
Before describing the proposed S-AMCQ routing algo-
rithm, we assume the following requirements are met in 
the vehicular network system  
1. Each vehicle has a unique identity Cv. This feature 
can be accomplished through an Electronic Li-
cence Plate (ELP) issued by a governmental trans-
portation authority or an Electronic Chassis Num-
ber (ECN) issued by the vehicle manufacturer [19].     
2. A Certification Authority (CA) exists that is 
known and trusted by all vehicles. It can be either 
a local transportation authority or the vehicle 
manufacturer.  
3. Each vehicle obtains a set of pseudonymous certif-
icates from the CA and legitimate RSUs along the 
road. In this paper, we adopt the pseudonymous 
authentication scheme (PASS) [20] where each ve-
hicle can use a pseudonymous certificate within a 
specific time slot, e.g., CertCA,Cv,j denotes the vehicle 
Cv’s pseudonymous certificate in the time slot TSj 
issued by the CA. It is assumed that RSUs connect 
with the CA and provide information dissemina-
tion and certificate updating services to vehicles. 
The CA determines the validity period of the 
pseudonymous certificate and the number of cer-
tificates that a vehicle has to obtain from RSUs de-
pending on the traffic density along the road. Un-
like other pseudonymous authentication schemes 
such as BP [19], PASS optimises the size of the cer-
tificate revocation list (CRL) to be linear with the 
number of revoked vehicles and unrelated to the 
number of pseudonymous certificates held by the 
  
revoked vehicle, e.g., 43800 pseudonymous certifi-
cates are added to the CRL when one vehicle is re-
voked in BP scheme [19]. Moreover, PASS pro-
vides strong privacy preservation to vehicles 
against the RSUs. For instance, in the efficient 
conditional privacy preservation (ECPP) scheme 
[21], the adversary can find out all the certificates 
that are issued by the compromised RSU for the 
vehicle of interest. However, in the PASS scheme, 
RSUs do not know what certificates a vehicle 
holds. The PASS scheme utilises the Schnorr digi-
tal signature algorithm [22] and SHA-1 [23] as the 
one-way hash function. However, since SHA-1 has 
been broken [24], we suggest using SHA-2 instead.  
4. The public key of the CA, i.e., PuKCA, the one-way 
hash function, and the digital signature algorithm 
are known to each vehicle and published by the 
CA.  
5. Vehicles cannot lie about their position, i.e., a se-
cure positioning solution is used.  
6. A tamper-proof device (TPD) is used to store the 
cryptographic information mentioned above. A 
TPD is a device that provides secure storage of 
cryptographic information and sensitive data as 
well as accelerating and securing cryptographic 
operations [25]. 
7. The Dedicated Short Range Communication 
(DSRC) standard is deployed. DSRC is a wireless 
technology designed to support a variety of appli-
cations based on vehicular communications, more 
specifically collision prevention applications [26]. 
It utilises the IEEE 802.11p Wireless Access for Ve-
hicular Environment (WAVE) standard at the PHY 
and MAC layers, which is more promising than 
other competing technologies such as the infra-
structure-based LTE to support beaconing in 
DSRC [27]. DSRC requires each vehicle to broad-
cast a routine traffic message called a Basic Safety 
Message (BSM), also known as a beacon, every 100 
ms. BSMs contain information on a vehicle’s cur-
rent status such as its location, velocity, direction, 
etc. We assume that BSMs are secured using the 
PASS scheme, and compromised vehicles, i.e., in-
ternal adversaries, cannot alter the information a 
BSM contains. 
3 RELATED WORK 
To the best of our knowledge, there are no previous stud-
ies on the development of a secure MCQ routing algo-
rithm using the ACO technique in VANETs. MCQ rout-
ing and securing the routing process in ad hoc networks 
have been separately studied. 
Recently, much work has been carried out on ACO-
based QoS routing algorithms for mobile ad hoc [28], [29], 
[30], [31], [32], [33], [34] and sensor networks [35], [36], 
[37], [38]. However, little attention has been given to 
providing MCQ routing in VANETs utilising the ACO 
technique. With regard to ACO-based QoS routing algo-
rithms for Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs), Liu et al. 
[29] propose an improved ant colony QoS routing algo-
rithm (IAQR). IAQR introduces a routing problem with 
four QoS constraints associated with nodes or links in-
cluding delay, bandwidth, jitter, and packet loss con-
straints. The algorithm can find a route in a MANET that 
satisfies more QoS requirements of the incoming traffic. It 
starts by removing links and nodes that do not satisfy the 
defined constraints, starting with the bandwidth con-
straint, from the network. It then initialises the phero-
mones on each link with a constant value and positions a 
set of ants at the source node. At each iteration Nc, each 
ant chooses its next hop based on the transition rule and 
updates the pheromone value of the link using a local 
pheromone evaporation parameter. Once it reaches the 
destination node, the ant calculates the objective function 
based on the achieved QoS metrics. Each ant continues 
searching for a route until the termination condition, Nc > 
Nmax, is met.  
A QoS-based clustering protocol for VANETs, named 
VANET QoS-OLSR, is proposed in [39]. The goal of this 
protocol is to form stable clusters and maintain their sta-
bility during communication and link failures while satis-
fying QoS requirements. Bandwidth, connectivity, and 
mobility are the metrics considered when computing the 
QoS value per node. VANET QoS-OLSR utilises the ACO 
technique to present a Multipoint Relays (MPRs) selection 
algorithm with respect to QoS and mobility constraints. 
Once elected, a cluster head sends ANT-HELLO messag-
es to its 2-hops away nodes. Each 2-hops away node that 
receives this ant message calculates its QoS metrics and 
inserts them in the message. The updated message is then 
propagated 2-hops away and the updating process is fol-
lowed until the ant reaches the destination cluster head. 
Once reached, the destination cluster head extracts the 
QoS metrics information from the ant and calculates the 
pheromone value of the whole route. The nodes belong-
ing to the route having the highest pheromone value are 
then selected to send an ANT-HELLO message back to 
the source cluster head. Finally, the source cluster head 
selects the nodes belonging to the discovered route that 
are located within its cluster as MPRs. 
It can be noticed that most of the ACO-based routing 
algorithms, including the above two mentioned algo-
rithms, employ the ACO technique without optimising its 
components for the network environment it is proposed 
for. For instance, pheromone deposit and evaporation 
processes are performed using constant parameters in 
most cases. Furthermore, in the context of vehicular net-
works, sending a set of ants to find feasible routes may 
not be a practical option. It implies a long delay waiting 
for the ants to finish their tours, and it is highly likely the 
network topology will have changed to a certain degree 
over that time, so that the discovered solutions may not 
be viable anymore. Therefore, the efficiency of ACO tech-
nique in the context of vehicular networks has not yet 
been well established in the literature. 
In the context of securing the routing process of ad hoc 
routing protocols proposed for VANETs, much work has 
been done to defend the routing process against potential 
external and internal adversaries [40]. Security mecha-
  
nisms such as digital signatures and message authentica-
tion codes are used to protect immutable information 
within the routing control messages, while mechanisms 
such as per-hop hashing and hash chains are used to pro-
tect the mutable information. Since these mechanisms are 
not enough to mitigate security attacks mounted by inter-
nal adversaries, two security mechanisms have been pro-
posed: reputation systems [41], [42], [43], [44] and plausi-
bility checks [45], [46], [47]. In the reputation system 
mechanism, each vehicle is assigned a reputation score 
based on its behaviour and feedback from other nodes. 
The message, generated by a node, is considered legiti-
mate if this node has a sufficiently high reputation score. 
A centralised reputation system is proposed in [44] where 
a reputation system server collects feedback from vehi-
cles, produces the reputation scores for vehicles, propa-
gates these reputations scores, and admits or revokes ve-
hicles from the system. Vehicles are supposed to com-
municate with the reputation server via RSUs. Digital 
signatures and message authentication code schemes are 
used to secure the communications between vehicles and 
the reputation system server. 
On the other hand, the plausibility checks mechanism 
aims to build a model for the current network at each 
node then checks the consistency of the received mes-
sage’s contents against the network model. Golle et al. [47] 
assumed that each vehicle maintains a model that con-
tains all the knowledge available to it about the vehicular 
network. The network model at each vehicle is based on 
formal definitions and logical reasoning of events and 
vehicles, and is used to determine if a reported event is 
consistent with the network model or not. For instance, if 
the contents of a received message claim that its sender is 
at a location that exceeds the maximum communication 
range of the receiver, then this message is considered in-
consistent with the network model, i.e., cannot be accept-
ed as valid. 
It can be noted that reputation systems produce extra 
communication overhead, and introduce higher delays 
into the routing process. Therefore, applying plausibility 
checks is preferable in VANETs since vehicular traffic 
information, road trajectory, and other related traffic in-
formation make it relatively easy to design formal defini-
tions of events for the vehicular network. 
4 ACO RULES FOR MCQ ROUTING IN VANETS 
4.1 Multi-Constrained (Optimal) Path Problem 
Let G(V, E) be an undirected graph representing a vehicu-
lar communication network where V is the set of vehicles 
and E is the set of links connecting the vehicles. Let m 
denote the number of QoS constraints Li where i = 1, 2, … 
m. Each link between two vehicles l(C1, C2) ∈ E is associat-
ed m weights corresponding to QoS constraints such that 
wi(C1, C2) ≥ 0. The MC(O)P problem is to determine if 
there is a route P from the source node s to the destination 
node d such that all the QoS constraints are met as de-
scribed in the following equation: 
wi(P)£ Li, i =1,2,... m    (1) 
If there is more than one route that satisfies the condition 
in (1), then the MC(O)P problem is to return the route that 
maximises the objective function F(P) as follows 
argmaxPÎM (s,d ) F(P)     (2) 
where M(s, d) is the set of available routes between s and 
d and F(P), the objective function, is defined as 
F(P)= Oi
Li
wi(P)
æ
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i=1
m
å     (3) 
where 0 < Oi  ≤ 1 are optimisation factors associated with 
each QoS constraint and depend on the transmitted traffic 
type. These values are experimental and can be varied by 
the application during data transmission. For instance, let 
L1 = 100 ms denote the end-to-end delay constraint and L2 
= 10 be the hop-count constraint, i.e., the number of QoS 
constraints m = 2. Let M(s, d) = {P1, P2} where w1(P1) = 77 
ms, w2(P1) = 8, w1(P2) = 89 ms, and w2(P2) = 7. Here, w1 rep-
resents the weight value of the end-to-end delay meas-
ured in [ms] and w2 represents the weight value of the 
hop-count. If the application intends to transmit voice 
traffic, then it could determine the optimisation factor for 
the end-to-end delay constraint O1 = 1 and for the hop-
count constraint O2 = 0.5. In this way, the objective func-
tion F(P) in (3) favours the route that has the least end-to-
end delay value since voice traffic is delay sensitive. Ac-
cording to (3), F(P) = 1.923 for P1 and F(P) = 1.837 for P2, 
thus P1 is selected for voice traffic transmission. However, 
if the application wants to transmit background traffic, 
then it could determine O1 = 0.5 and O2 = 0.8, i.e., F(P) 
favours the shortest route with an acceptable end-to-end 
delay value. In this case, F(P) = 1.649 for P1 and F(P) = 
1.704 for P2, thus P2 is selected for background traffic 
transmission. 
4.2 ACO Rules  
In the ACO technique, a number of artificial ants build 
solutions to an optimisation problem and exchange in-
formation on the quality of their solutions via a commu-
nication scheme that is reminiscent of the one adopted by 
real ants [16]. The communication scheme includes the 
following rules: the state transition rule, the pheromone 
deposit rule, and the pheromone evaporation rule. Prior 
to discussing the developed ACO rules, we define the 
link reliability value between two vehicles. Since the ACO 
rules are developed to work in a vehicular network envi-
ronment, it is vital for ants to traverse links that are more 
reliable than others. In this way, ants avoid traversing 
vulnerable links that are highly prone to breakage and, 
consequently, avoid searching near weak solutions. 
In [48], we define the link reliability as the probability 
that a direct communication link between two vehicles Ci 
and Cj will stay continuously available over a specified 
time period. In order to calculate the link reliability rt(l), 
the vehicles’ velocity parameters are utilised. It is as-
sumed that vehicular velocity has a normal distribution 
[49], [50]. Given Tij for the continuous availability of a 
specific link l(Ci, Cj) between two vehicles at time t, the 
link reliability value rt(l) is defined as follows 
  
rt (l)=
f (T )dt if Tij > 0t
t+Tij
ò
0 otherwise
ì
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where f(T) denotes the probability density function of the 
communication duration T and is calculated as follows 
f (T )=
4H
s Dv 2p
1
T 2
e
-
(
2H
T
-mDv )
2
2sDv
2
forT ³ 0      (5) 
where µΔv and σ
2
Δv denote the mean and the variance of the 
relative velocity Δv between two vehicles measured in 
[m/s], respectively, H denotes the wireless communication 
range measured in [m], and Tij is calculated as follows 
Tij =
H -q (yi - y j )
2 + (xi - x j )
2
| vi -Jv j |
   
(6) 
where θ = -1 and ϑ = 1 when Cj overtakes Ci, θ = 1 and ϑ = 
1 when Ci moves forward in front of Cj, θ = -1 and ϑ = -1 
when Ci and Cj are moving toward each other, and θ = 1 
and ϑ = -1 when Ci and Cj are moving away from each 
other. For any given route P(s, d) between the source s 
and the destination d, denote the number of its links as Ω: 
l1 = (s, C1), l2 = (C1, C2)… lΩ = (CΩ, d). For each link lω (ω = 1, 
2… Ω), denote by rt(lω) the value of its link reliability as 
calculated using (4). The route reliability for a route P, 
denoted by R(P(s, d)), is defined as follows 
R(P(s,d))= rt (lw ) where 0 £ R(P(s,d))w=1
W
Õ £1
 
(7) 
i.e., the route reliability value is the product of the link 
reliability values of the links that compose this route.  
4.2.1 The State Transition Rule 
While searching for feasible routes, ants select their next 
hop when they arrive at intermediate nodes based on a 
stochastic mechanism called the state transition rule. 
Suppose ant Ak arrives at an intermediate node Ci. If the 
node’s pheromone table RTi does not contain routing in-
formation to the destination node d, then ant Ak will be 
broadcast. Otherwise, Ak selects Cj in RT
i as its next hop 
toward d according to (8) if U ≤ U0 where U is a random 
number uniformly distributed in [0, 1], and U0 is a con-
stant number selected between 0 and 1 
argmax
C jÎN (s
d )
{[t ij (t)]
a[Tij (t)]
b}
   
(8) 
where τij(t) is the pheromone level associated with link 
l(Ci, Cj), α and β are parameters that control the relative 
importance of the pheromone level versus the predicted 
link lifetime, and N(sd) is the set of neighbouring nodes of 
Ci yet to be visited by Ak over which a route to d is known. 
Otherwise, if U > U0, then the probability that ant Ak se-
lects Cj as its next hop from Ci toward d is calculated ac-
cording to (9) 
pij
Ak =
[t ij (t)]
a[Tij (t)]
b
[t ie(t)]
a[Tie(t)]
b
CeÎN (i)
å
if C j Î N(i)
0 otherwise
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The parameters U and U0 determine the relative im-
portance of exploration versus exploitation in the state 
transition rule. High values of U0 mean that Ak prefers 
transition toward nodes that have larger amount of pher-
omone and longer link lifetimes according to (8), i.e., ex-
ploitation. In this case, the probability of exploring new 
routes decreases and S-AMCQ algorithm could suffer 
from stagnation. In contrast, small values of U0 give Ak the 
opportunity to explore new links rather than just exploit 
the pheromone level and follow the trail, i.e., exploration. 
In the context of VANETs, selecting the value of U0 de-
pends on the status of vehicular topology and the degree 
of the environment dynamics. For instance, if the network 
density is high and the topology is stable, e.g., a highway 
in rush hour, it is preferable to choose a high value for U0 
since the communication links among vehicles are rela-
tively stable. However, if the performance of S-AMCQ 
algorithm decreases due to stagnation, then the U0 value 
should be decreased to allow ants to explore new routes.  
We suggest letting the routing algorithm decide and ad-
just the value of U0 depending on the vehicular topology 
dynamics and the performance obtained. 
4.2.2 The Pheromone Deposit Rule 
Generally, the level of pheromone on a communication 
link/route between two vehicles reflects the quality of 
that link/route with respect to the QoS constraints con-
sidered. The quality of the communication link depends 
on the traffic class it is established for, i.e., the level of 
pheromone depends on the QoS constraints required by 
that traffic class. Therefore, each ant Ak carries the traffic 
class identifier (TC_ID) and its corresponding QoS con-
straints. While moving from node Ci to node Cj, a specific 
amount of pheromone, denoted by τij
Ak, is deposited on 
link l(Ci, Cj) by ant Ak where τij
Ak is calculated as follows 
t ij
Ak (t)= a(rt (l))+b
Li
wi(l)
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where a > 0, b > 0, and (a+b) = 1. Li denotes a QoS con-
straint, and rt(l) denotes the reliability value of link l. It 
can be noted that the relative importance of the link relia-
bility is expressed in (10) and gives weight to the phero-
mone value because ants should traverse through more 
reliable links. In this way, the pheromone level of the link 
l is determined considering its QoS metrics and its relia-
bility value. We worked out this function by experimenta-
tion and its validity is illustrated by simulation results in 
section 7. 
4.2.3 The Pheromone Evaporation Rule 
S-AMCQ routing algorithm offers a mechanism to pro-
cess the evaporation of the pheromone trails left on the 
traversed links. The pheromone evaporation process is 
extremely important to avoid rapid convergence toward a 
suboptimal search space, and to explore new routes. In 
this way, the pheromone evaporation process minimises 
the influence of past routes and helps avoid the stagna-
tion problem. However, unlike conventional ACO algo-
rithms, here the evaporation process is kept separate from 
the pheromone deposit process. Moreover, the evapora-
tion rate is not constant but a variable value for each link 
Comment [TO1]: For consistency of 
notation instead of using N(i)you 
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depending on its status. The reasons behind these ad-
justments are linked to the fact that these ACO rules are 
proposed to perform a route discovery process in a highly 
dynamic network, i.e., a VANET. Considering the highly 
dynamic nature of VANETs, the pheromone level on a 
communication link should have completely evaporated 
by the end of its expected lifetime. In this way, the next 
generation of ants avoids using this link, which is as-
sumed to be unavailable. According to the link reliability 
definition, the expected link lifetime Tij
e
 for a link l(Ci, Cj) 
can be calculated as follows 
Tij
e = rt (l)Tij           (11) 
Every tex seconds, each node decreases the pheromone 
level of all its links using the following formula 
t ij (t+ t
ex )= (1-r)t ij (t)          (12) 
after η times of applying (12), where ρ is the evaporation 
rate 0 < ρ < 1, assuming the initial pheromone level is τ0 
for each link where τ0 ≥ 0, (12) can be written as follows 
t 0 » (1-r)
ht ij whereh =
Tij
e
tex
        (13) 
Thus, the evaporation rate ρ can be calculated as follows 
r =1-
t 0
t ij
h       (14) 
5 THE EXTENDED VANET-ORIENTED EVOLVING 
GRAPH (E-VOEG) MODEL 
The evolving graph theory has been proposed as a formal 
abstraction of dynamic networks to help capture its be-
haviour when the mobility patterns are predictable [51], 
[52], [53]. In definition, the evolving graph is an indexed 
sequence of λ subgraphs of a given graph, where the sub-
graph at a given index corresponds to the network con-
nectivity at the time interval indicated by the index num-
ber. Since the current evolving graph theory cannot be 
applied directly to VANETs, we extended the current 
evolving graph model in [18] to address the evolving 
properties of the VANET communication graph and con-
sider only the reliability of communication links among 
vehicles. The extended version of the evolving graph 
model, called the VANET-oriented Evolving Graph 
(VoEG), is evolving based on the predicted dynamic pat-
terns of vehicular traffic. In this paper, we extend the 
VoEG model to consider the QoS of communication links 
among vehicles with respect to the QoS requirements of a 
specific data type. Besides, we propose construction and 
maintenance mechanisms to securely build and maintain 
the E-VoEG model. 
Fig. 1 illustrates an example of the E-VoEG model on a 
highway at t = 5s. Each node in Fig. 1 represents a vehicle 
on the highway. We associate the following 3-tuple (t, 
TC_ID, τt(l)) with each edge (link), where t denotes the 
current time, TC_ID denotes the traffic class identifier this 
link is established for, and τt(l) denotes the pheromone 
value associated with l at time t according to the QoS con-
straints required by TC_ID as calculated in (10). 
In the E-VoEG model, the communication link between 
two vehicles is not available if its pheromone value τt(l) 
equals 0. The pheromone value is set to 0 when the link l 
between two vehicles violates any of the QoS constraints 
required by the data traffic type. Fig. 1 shows the E-VoEG 
status and the pheromone values associated with each 
link for TC_ID = 1. It can be noticed that links {B, E} and 
{F, G} are not eligible to be traversed since τ5({B, E}) = 
τ5({F, G}) = 0. Other links such as {A, C} are eligible to be 
traversed. It is worth noting that even if the link l is eligi-
ble to be traversed, it does not necessarily mean that it 
will be chosen to be part of the optimal route. The pher-
omone values which are associated with each linkare not 
constant and change in accordance with the dynamics of 
the vehicular network topology.  
5.1 Construction and Maintenance Processes of 
the E-VoEG Model 
As mentioned earlier, it is relatively easier in VANETs to 
build a formal model of the network topology than in 
other types of mobile ad hoc networks. The reason is the 
availability of additional information that can be useful to 
build and integrate a dynamic model of the VANET 
communication graph at each vehicle in the network. We 
assume that each vehicle can build and maintain an E-
VoEG model of the current vehicular network status. We 
start with the construction process where the broadcasted 
BSMs are utilised. Each vehicle that receives a BSM uses 
its information, which is assumed to be correct and au-
thentic due to the fact that they are protected using the 
PASS scheme, to construct its E-VoEG model and define 
its links. Each link in the constructed E-VoEG model is 
assigned with Tij, the predicted link lifetime as calculated 
in (6). At this stage, no pheromone values are associated 
with the existed links since no route discovery process is 
in progress. Once the vehicle receives routing control 
messages, it uses the received information to assign a 
pheromone value to each link in the constructed E-VoEG 
according to the QoS requirements of TC_ID. In this way, 
each vehicle could associate different pheromone values 
with the same link depending on its quality with respect 
to a specific traffic class. It is worth noting that the E-
VoEG model within each vehicle represents the local ve-
hicular network topology that surrounds it. This is due to 
the fact that BSMs cannot traverse the whole network 
topology as they are dropped after a specific number of 
Fig. 1. The Proposed E-VoEG Model at t = 5s where TC_ID = 1  
 
 
A 
B 
D 
C 
(5,1,0) 
 
(5,1,8.4) 
 
(5,1,16.1) 
 
(5,1,14.4) 
 
(5,1,11.2) 
 
(5,1,6.8) 
 
E 
G 
F 
(5,1,22.4) 
 
(5,1,0) 
 
(5,1,9.4) 
 
(5,1,7) 
 
Comment [TO2]: This should be > 
Comment [TO3]:  
Comment [TO4]: As the decay in the 
pheromone value is exponential it will 
never evaporate completely. I would say 
if the value falls below a certain level it is 
set to zero. 
  
hops, e.g., 30 hops.  
With regard to the maintenance process, each vehicle 
can keep an accurate state of the current E-VoEG model 
using the information of the received BSMs and authenti-
cated routing control messages, and the predicted dy-
namic patterns of vehicular traffic. The reason that the E-
VoEG maintenance process still needs to predict the mo-
bility patterns of its nodes, i.e., vehicles, is that the suc-
cessful reception probability of BSMs is lower than the 
necessary threshold [55]. Therefore, the successfully re-
ceived BSMs can be used to tune the current E-VoEG sta-
tus. It is important to note that within a specific threshold, 
the received information at time t on location, velocity, 
direction, etc. of neighbouring vehicles should be con-
sistent between BSMs and the predicted mobility pat-
terns. Inconsistent received information is either suspi-
cious, i.e., BSMs are cracked, or the information used to 
build the original E-VoEG model is incorrect. Either way, 
the E-VoEG model is reinitialised, and a report on this 
situation is sent back to the source node when a route 
discovery is in progress. 
6 SECURE ANT-BASED MULTI-CONSTRAINED QOS 
ROUTING ALGORITHM (S-AMCQ) 
6.1 Routing Control Ants 
The routing control ants are responsible for traversing the 
vehicular network to compute feasible routes from the 
source to the destination vehicles. The movements of 
these ants are restricted by the state transition rule de-
fined in (8) and (9) when sufficient information is availa-
ble at the pheromone tables, or they will be broadcast. We 
propose three types of routing control ants: the routing 
request ant (RQANT), the routing reply ant (RPANT), 
and the routing error ant (REANT). For each field in the 
proposed routing control ants, we describe its nature, i.e., 
immutable, mutable and traceable, and mutable but un-
traceable, and its data type, i.e., integer, double, etc. to 
estimate its size later. This description is important for 
explaining the secure route discovery process later. 
6.1.1 Routing Request Ant (RQANT)  
In addition to the default fields of conventional routing 
request messages such as the destination address, origina-
tor address, etc., which are immutable, the following 
fields are added to a RQANT 
1. RQANT_ID (u_int8_t) contains the ant’s ID, which 
is immutable.  
2. RQANT_Gen (u_int8_t) indicates the current ant 
generation, which is immutable. Different ant gen-
erations could be involved in the route discovery 
process of the same destination. This field plays an 
essential role in decreasing the proliferation of 
ants. When a node receives another ant from the 
same generation looking for the same destination, 
it may only be processed if it presents a better 
route than the existing one. Otherwise, it is dis-
carded.  
3. RQANT_TC (u_int8_t) contains the traffic class 
identifier TC_ID the current route discovery pro-
cess is issued for, which is immutable. This field is 
important to distinguish different QoS require-
ments while searching for feasible routes for dif-
ferent traffic types.   
4. TimeStamp (double) contains the time when the 
RQANT is generated, which is immutable.  
5. TraversedList (double) contains the list of vehicles 
the RQANT has traversed. The first node in this 
list is the source node while the last one is the 
node that processes and forwards the RQANT. 
This field is mutable and traceable.  
6. QoS_Metrics (double) contains the reliability and 
the weight value of each QoS constraint of the 
route that the RQANT has travelled so far. This 
field is mutable and traceable.  
7. QoS_Constraints (double) contains the QoS con-
straints that should be satisfied according to the 
traffic class found in the RQANT_TC field, which 
is immutable. These QoS constraints are necessary 
to calculate the pheromone value of the traversed 
link/route. 
6.1.2 Routing Reply Ant (RPANT)  
The RPANT is designed to set up forward routes to the 
destination node considering the quality of the links it has 
traversed. The RPANT message includes the following 
fields  
1. RPANT_ID (u_int8_t) contains the ant’s ID, which 
is immutable. Each RPANT travels back to the 
source node following the pheromone trail left by 
the RQANT that generated it during the route dis-
covery process.  
2. RPANT_Gen (u_int8_t) indicates the current ant 
generation, which matches that given in the 
RQANT_Gen field of the RQANT, which generated 
it. This field is immutable.   
3. RPANT_TC (u_int8_t) contains the traffic type the 
current route discovery process is issued for, 
which is immutable. Its contents match those of 
the RQANT_TC field of the RQANT, which gener-
ated it.  
4. TraversedList (double) contains the list of vehicles 
the RPANT should traverse to reach the source 
node. This field is set by the destination node and 
is immutable.  
5. QoS_Constraints (double) contains the QoS con-
straints that should be satisfied according to the 
traffic class found in the RPANT_TC field, which is 
immutable. 
6.1.3 Routing Error Ant (REANT)  
The REANT is designed to announce a link breakage 
when it occurs. The REANT message includes the follow-
ing fields  
1. REANT_ID (u_int8_t) contains the ant’s ID, which 
is immutable. REANTs traverse back to the pre-
ceding vehicles along a route to a vehicle that be-
came unavailable due to a link breakage.   
2. REANT_UDEST (IP_Address) contains a list of ad-
dresses of the destination vehicle(s) that become 
  
unreachable due to the occurred link breakage, 
which is immutable. IP_Address is a 32bit data 
type for IPv4 addresses.  
6.2 The Pheromone Table  
Pheromone tables RTi at each node contain the infor-
mation needed to route data packets and routing control 
ants through the vehicular network efficiently. In addi-
tion to the conventional information such as source ad-
dress, destination address, next hop, etc., each entry in RTi 
contains the following information  
1. TC_TYPE contains the traffic type this entry is cre-
ated for. In this way, pheromone tables could have 
different routes to the same destination, each asso-
ciated with a specific traffic type.  
2. QoS_Metrics contains the reliability and the weight 
value of each QoS constraint associated with this 
entry. 
3. rt_pherm contains the pheromone level associated 
with this entry calculated according to the QoS 
constraints defined by the data traffic type.   
4. rt_evp contains the evaporation rate of this entry. 
Each node uses this field to ensure the pheromone 
table entry evaporates at the end of its expected 
lifetime as explained in (12), (13) and (14). 
6.3 Route Discovery Process in S-AMCQ Routing 
Algorithm  
In this section, we describe the route discovery process in 
S-AMCQ routing algorithm. It can be noticed from the 
design of routing control ants that they do not carry the 
pheromone value, which is used by intermediate nodes to 
update their routing tables. As described earlier, the 
pheromone value is calculated using the information car-
ried by the routing control ants. This is a main design 
advantage of S-AMCQ routing algorithm because all we 
need to do is to ensure that the necessary information to 
calculate the pheromone value is authentic, i.e., created or 
updated by authenticated vehicles. As the plausibility 
checks in the next section are dedicated to defending the 
route discovery process against internal adversaries, we 
suggest using the digital signature mechanism to protect 
the routing control ants from external adversaries, and 
ensure their integrity and authenticity. The digital signa-
ture mechanism is applied to all control messages in S-
AMCQ. In the following, we illustrate the route discovery 
process in S-AMCQ routing algorithm when plausibility 
checks are applied, and the digital signature mechanism 
from the PASS scheme is utilised. 
When the source node s has data that belongs to a spe-
cific traffic class, TC_ID, to send, it commences a new 
route discovery process if no route to the destination 
node d associated with TC_ID is known. It starts by ini-
tialising the immutable fields of a RQANT and leaves the 
QoS_Metrics and TraversedList fields empty. After that, it 
uses the one-way hash function Hash(.) to hash all the 
immutable fields and produce the message digest 
RQANTm. Then, s uses SKs,j the secret signing key of s for 
the current timeslot TSj associated with its pseudony-
mous certificate CertCA,s,j to sign RQANTm ,i.e., obtains the 
signature DSigs,RQANTm = Sign(SKs,j, RQANTm) where. Final-
ly, s attaches its signature to the RQANT message, and 
broadcasts it to its neighbours. It can be noted that the 
used certificate, CertCA,s,j, is issued directly by the CA. 
However, for future route discovery processes, after s has 
obtained an updated certificate from an authenticated 
RSUx, the used certificate will be CertRSUx,s,j. In both cases, 
either s utilised CertCA,s,j or CertRSUx,s,j, its certificate is not 
attached to the RQANT message because it is distributed 
and verified by its neighbouring vehicles during the 
transmission of BSMs. We assumed that BSMs are pro-
tected using the PASS scheme therefore there is no need 
to send the certificate again. In this way, we reduce the 
verification overhead at the neighbouring vehicles when 
they receive this RQANT, to signature verification only, 
and reduce the communication overhead by not transmit-
ting the source’s certificate. It is important to notice that 
this solution is feasible within the certificate validity peri-
od, i.e., before the vehicle changes its certificate to a new 
one. Hence, s and other nodes should always ensure that 
the current utilised certificate is distributed during the 
transmission of BSMs. 
When an intermediate node Cv receives the control 
message (RQANT, DSigs,RQANTm) from s, it verifies the sig-
nature DSigs,RQANTm by computing the hash value over the 
RQANT message’s immutable fields, and verifies the re-
sulting RQANTm against the signed value attached to the 
RQANT. If Verify(PKs,j, RQANTm, DSigs,RQANTm) is success-
ful, where PKs,j is the public key of s for the timeslot TSj, 
then the RQANT message is accepted, and the plausibil-
ity checks are performed at this stage. If the RQANT fails 
any of the plausibility checks, then it is discarded and the 
sender vehicle is reported as malicious. If the plausibility 
checks were successful, Cv checks if this RQANT has been 
processed before, i.e., with the same RQANT_ID and 
RQANT_Gen information. If yes, then it is discarded; oth-
erwise, Cv calculates the QoS metrics and the reliability 
value of the link l(Cv, s). If l(Cv, s) violates any of the QoS 
constraints determined by the data traffic class TC_ID, 
then this RQANT is discarded, and the pheromone value 
of l(Cv, s) is set to 0. Otherwise, Cv continues by either in-
serting a new, or updating an existing pheromone table 
entry to the node it receives the RQANT from, in this case 
s, depending on the pheromone value calculated accord-
ing to the QoS metrics and constraints determined by 
TC_ID. After that, Cv updates the mutable information of 
the RQANT message as follows. It inserts the new calcu-
lated QoS metrics and reliability value into QoS_Metrics 
field, and inserts its identifier into the TraversedList field. 
After that, it signs the updated RQANT message fields 
only, i.e., QoS_Metrics and TraversedList fields, using the 
same mechanism described above, and attaches its signa-
ture DSigCv,RQANTm along with DSigs,RQANTm to RQANT. In 
this way, each RQANT after this stage will contain two 
signatures, the source node’s one on the immutable fields 
and the signature of the last node that processed this 
RQANT on the mutable fields. The second signature 
should be verified, this can be done by using the identifier 
of the last node in TraversedList field to identify the public 
key to be used. Finally, Cv checks its pheromone table for 
  
route entries to d. If an entry is found, the RQANT is for-
warded based on the transition rule defined in (8) and (9), 
else it is broadcasted again. If any of the mentioned secu-
rity information verifications fail, then the RQANT is dis-
carded. 
For each intermediate node that receives this RQANT 
message later, it verifies the two included signatures, and 
ensures that the node it receives this RQANT from is the 
last one in the TraversedList field. After that, it processes 
the RQANT as described above. The process continues 
until the destination node d is reached. On receipt of a 
valid RQANT, d generates a RPANT and sends it back to 
s following the route found in the TraversedList field, i.e., 
following the trail of the received RQANT to arrive at s. 
The RPANT is protected using the signature of d only 
since all its fields are immutable. At each intermediate 
node, when the RPANT is received, the signature of d is 
verified, and the QoS metrics of the forward link/route 
toward d are evaluated based on the QoS constraints, 
TC_ID, and the E-VoEG model information. It is im-
portant to note that, in S-AMCQ, d is allowed to process 
multiple RQANTs and send a RPANT for each if its dis-
covered route satisfies the QoS requirements.  
Finally, s evaluates the computed routes M(s, d) = {P1, 
P2… Pz}, and selects the route that maximises the objective 
function F(P) value defined in (3). The source node is al-
lowed to start data transmission once it receives the first 
RPANT with a feasible route. If a better route becomes 
available upon receipt of another RPANT, then s will 
choose the optimal route according to (2), and so on. In 
both cases, all feasible routes, i.e., M(s, d), are kept at s for 
further use if needed as explained later in the route 
maintenance process. This is done to avoid the delay that 
would occur if s waited until two or more RPANTs had 
arrived before transmitting data. 
Using the method described above, S-AMCQ ensures 
the authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation of the 
information within its control messages while protecting 
vehicles privacy using pseudonymous certificates. Exter-
nal adversaries cannot carry out route disruption, or per-
form creation of incorrect routing state attacks because 
any spoofed control message is going to be detected. 
However, the adversary can still create spoofed control 
ants and send them to one or more vehicles for verifica-
tion. Although a spoofed control ant will be discarded, 
the verification process consumes time and may jeopard-
ise the availability of the target vehicle(s). In case the ad-
versary unicast the spoofed control ants, the denial of 
service at the target vehicle does not affect the ability of S-
AMCQ to discover feasible routes that do not pass in-
clude the target vehicle. The reason is that S-AMCQ is 
originally a multipath routing algorithm. However, if the 
spoofed control ants are broadcast, then blocking the 
sender of these ants when possible can mitigate this at-
tack. 
6.4 Plausibility Checks for S-AMCQ Routing 
Algorithm  
As the proposed mechanism described in the previous 
section cannot protect the routing process from internal 
adversaries, we suggest putting plausibility checks in 
place. In the following, we focus our discussion on pro-
tecting mutable information within the routing control 
ants based on the E-VoEG model and the properties of S-
AMCQ routing algorithm. 
6.4.1 QoS Metrics Check  
When an intermediate node authenticates a received rout-
ing control ant from another node, it verifies the QoS met-
rics and reliability value it contains against those that are 
calculated in the E-VoEG model. As mentioned earlier, 
the kinematic information is primarily utilised to evaluate 
the link/route reliability between two vehicles. Besides 
that, other information such as the hop-count, when the 
route cost is a required constraint, is used to evaluate the 
QoS metrics of each link/route with respect to the re-
quired QoS constraints. Since the E-VoEG model is built 
and maintained using the BSMs information, the QoS 
metrics of its links can be calculated and updated accord-
ing to the dynamics of the vehicular network topology. 
For instance, assume there is an internal adversary who 
does not perform the calculations needed to estimate the 
route reliability value or the route cost intentionally, e.g., 
multiplies the reliability value by 1 or 0 instead of apply-
ing (7), or decreases the hop-count value to shorten the 
traversed route so the compromised node can be included 
in the optimal route. In this case, this falsified information 
can be detected using the E-VoEG model because the 
travelled route is found in the TraversedList field. Since the 
last node that processed the received RQANT signs this 
field, we ensure that no external adversary has changed 
its contents. Moreover, we also ensure that TC_ID and the 
QoS constraints are authenticated because they are signed 
by s. In this way, the last node that processed this 
RQANT can be reported as a malicious node, i.e., an in-
ternal adversary. If a node is reported as malicious, ants 
should avoid traversing through this node. Moreover, 
any routing control ant that is received from this node is 
discarded immediately. It is worth noting that the esti-
mated QoS metrics are compared with those found in 
QoS_Metrics field within a specific threshold as the E-
VoEG model is based on information received from BSMs 
and predicted mobility patterns. 
Despite the applied digital signatures and the plausi-
bility check we mentioned above, the internal adversary 
is still able to mount the following attack. The adversary 
can modify the TraversedList field by either adding or re-
moving nodes. After that, it calculates the QoS metrics 
with respect to the modified TraversedList because it has 
access to the E-VoEG model. This modification cannot be 
detected because all fields and information verify correct-
ly. However, there is no actual gain from this attack for 
the following reasons. Firstly, if the adversary adds more 
nodes to TraversedList trying to prevent a specific route 
from being selected, the route discovery process can dis-
cover this route using other nodes since the S-AMCQ is a 
multipath routing algorithm. Secondly, if the adversary 
removes nodes to make the current route look shorter and 
has better QoS metrics, then it still has to do that with 
respect to the E-VoEG model, e.g., it cannot claim to be 
  
connected to a node that is outside of its communication 
range. Therefore, this modification can be detected at s 
when the received routes are evaluated. Here, we have 
assumed that there is only one internal adversary. 
6.4.2 Control Messages Broadcast Check  
According to the state transition rule in (8) and (9), 
RQANTs are broadcasted by s at the beginning of a route 
discovery process, and by intermediate nodes when no 
valid route toward the destination d is known. Therefore, 
RPANTs and REANTs cannot be broadcast at any stage. 
If any node receives one of these control messages as a 
broadcast message, then it should discard it immediately 
without performing any verification process. Thus, this 
plausibility check is performed before the verification 
process, which saves time and resources. In regard to 
RQANTs, if an intermediate node keeps receiving broad-
cast RQANTs from a specific node even though, accord-
ing to its E-VoEG model, it does have a route to d, then it 
is reported as a malicious node. This plausibility check 
depends on the fact that the broadcasting of control ants 
in S-AMCQ is limited and it stops when the intermediate 
node has a route to d, i.e., rebroadcasting is not inevitable. 
6.4.3 Link Breakage Check  
This plausibility check is designed to detect malicious 
routing error messages, i.e., REANTs. The E-VoEG model 
is utilised to perform this check. There is a possibility that 
an internal adversary sends a REANT to invalidate a val-
id link/route between two nodes. This attack would be 
mounted to degrade the QoS of the network and divert 
the established route through specific vehicles that might 
have been compromised by the attacker. The consistency 
of the error message is checked against the current status 
of the vehicular network, i.e., the E-VoEG model. The link 
that is claimed by the received REANT to be broken is 
verified against the E-VoEG model to ensure its phero-
mone value can really have evaporated at this stage, or 
the vehicular network topology has changed suddenly so 
the link breakage occurs. If the REANT is not in conformi-
ty with the E-VoEG’s status, then it is discarded and the 
sender of that REANT is reported as a malicious node. 
6.5 Route Maintenance Process in S-AMCQ 
Routing Algorithm  
When an unpredicted link breakage occurs, it is reported 
back to s either to start a new route discovery process, or 
switch to another feasible route in M(s, d). The plausibility 
check on link breakage is applied to ensure the received 
REANT is legitimate. If the REANT is legitimate and M(s, 
d) is empty, s starts a new route discovery process. Oth-
erwise, switching to another feasible route is commenced. 
Prior to making the switch, s should ensure this available 
feasible route still satisfies the QoS requirements. This 
task is accomplished using the E-VoEG model infor-
mation at s. After that, s can select the evaluated route as 
a new best route because it still satisfies the QoS con-
straints, or s starts a new route discovery process. 
7 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF S-AMCQ 
ROUTING ALGORITHM 
The main objective of the following performance evalua-
tion is to investigate how the time overhead needed to 
sign, transmit, and verify the routing control ants can af-
fect the performance of S-AMCQ routing algorithm. Be-
sides, we want to investigate the effectiveness of S-AMCQ 
in computing feasible routes subject to multiple QoS con-
straints in VANETs. As the implementation of the PASS 
scheme is not available to us, we discuss the delays 
caused by the authentication process numerically, and 
insert the resulting numbers into the S-AMCQ implemen-
tation for the simulation experiment later. 
7.1 Implementation Details and Numerical Results  
In this section, the authentication overhead of PASS 
scheme in terms of signing, verifying, and transmitting 
delays of a routing control ant is discussed. The overhead 
of certificate revocation, certificate updating, and storage 
of pseudonymous certificates and signing keys are not 
considered in our discussion because they are not directly 
related to the routing algorithm. We assumed that the 
overhead of certificate management operations is already 
taken care of during the transmission of BSMs thus it is 
not required solely to secure the routing process. Let Tpto 
denote the processing time overhead needed to secure 
and verify a routing control ant, e.g., RQANT. Tpto is calcu-
lated as follows 
Tpto =Tsign +Tcomm +Tver         (15) 
where Tsign is the processing time needed to sign the 
RQANT, Tcomm is the time needed to transmit the signed 
message {RQANT, DSigs,RQANTm, DSigCv,RQANTm}, which in-
cludes two digital signatures of s and Cv, and Tver is the 
processing time needed to verify the signed RQANT. 
Based on the structure of each type of routing control ant 
we proposed in section 6.1, the size of each type can be 
estimated as follows: RQANT = 71 bytes and RPANT = 31 
bytes where we assumed the number of QoS constraints m 
= 2 and double data is 4 bytes while u_int8_t data is 1 byte. 
Considering the largest control message, which is a 
RQANT, the Schnorr signature size is 42 bytes thus the 
resulting total message size is 71+42+42 = 155 bytes in-
cluding the original message and the digital signatures of 
the source node and the last node Cv that transmitted it. It 
can be noted that the resulting message size is approxi-
mately twice that of the original message. Suppose the 
data transmission rate is 12 Mbps, the resulting message, 
which is 155 bytes, needs approximately Tcomm = 0.103 ms 
to be transmitted to the next hop while the original mes-
sage, which is 71 bytes, needs approximately 0.047 ms, i.e., 
0.056 ms is the communication time overhead required to 
transmit the security information. 
The time needed to sign a RQANT message using the 
Schnorr signature algorithm is estimated to 0.6 ms where 
vehicles are assumed to be equipped with an Intel Penti-
um-4 3.0 GHz machine [20]. This overhead is acceptable 
and does not affect the accuracy of the control message’s 
contents, e.g., QoS_Metrics. Let us consider the following 
scenario where the observed vehicle moves on the high-
speed lane of a highway at 80 km/h, i.e., 22.22 m/s on aver-
Comment [TO5]: This is because you 
only store one backup feasible route in 
the simulations and ought to mention 
this. 
  
age. After generating the routing control ant, the signing 
operation takes about 0.6 ms, during this time the vehicle 
could change its location at most 13.33 mm, which does 
not affect the accuracy of the calculated QoS metrics or 
the reliability value. Finally, we estimate the verification 
overhead Tver of the signed RQANT message, which in-
cludes the time needed to verify two digital signatures. In 
the PASS scheme, the time needed to verify the digital 
signature is 1.2 ms. Therefore, the resulting total overhead 
Tpto of RQANT in (15) is approximately 3.103 ms including 
Tcomm = 0.103 ms, Tsign = 0.6 ms, and 2Tver = 2.4 ms.  
7.2 Simulation Setup – Voice Traffic Transmission 
We choose voice traffic transmission to evaluate the per-
formance of S-AMCQ routing algorithm because voice 
traffic is delay sensitive. A simple simulation scenario is 
constructed where a VoIP source vehicle generates a 
voice traffic stream and sends it over VANET to a VoIP 
receiver vehicle. The VoIP sender is a constant bitrate 
(CBR) source that alternates between talk state, where it 
acts as a CBR source and sends packets of size talkPack-
etSize every packetizationInterval seconds to the VoIP re-
ceiver over UDP, and state silence where no packets are 
sent. 
The simulations are conducted using the OMNet++ 4.3 
network simulator [56] where 20 runs of each simulation 
experiment is performed, the average of the runs is ob-
tained, and 95% confidence intervals are computed to 
indicate the statistical significance of the simulation re-
sults. The simulations were run on a three lanes 10 km 
highway traffic scenario where the number of vehicles is 
varied from 15 to 75 vehicles. We utilised the highway 
mobility model developed in [48], which is built based on 
traffic theory rules, and considers the drivers’ behaviour. 
The average velocity of the vehicles in each lane is 40 
km/h, 60 km/h, and 80 km/h, respectively. For each simula-
tion run, two vehicles are chosen randomly as the ob-
served vehicles, i.e., source/destination pair. The IAQR, 
S-AMCQ and AMCQ routing algorithms are evaluated in 
the simulation experiment where AMCQ means that no 
security mechanisms are applied. The QoS constraints m 
= 2 where L1 = 100 ms for the delay constraint and L2 = 10 
hops for the route cost constraint. The VoIP application 
sets the optimisation factors O1 = 1 for the delay con-
straint and O2 = 0.5 for the route cost constraint, and talk-
PacketSize = 40 bytes and packetizationInterval = 20 ms. The 
time needed to perform the plausibility checks using the 
E-VoEG model is neglected. For the ACO rules, α = β = 
0.5, τ0 = 5, U0 = 0.6, a = 0.6, and b = 0.4. 
7.3 Performance Metrics  
The following four performance metrics are considered in 
this simulation experiment 
1. Average packet delivery ratio (PDR): represents 
the average ratio of the number of successfully re-
ceived data packets at the destination node to the 
number of data packets sent. 
2. Average time for route discovery: represents the 
time needed to perform the route discovery pro-
cess, i.e., the time interval between sending a 
RQANT from s and receiving the first RPANT 
from d. 
3. Mean Opinion Score [57] (MOS): MOS is a value 
between 1 and 5 that indicates a human user's 
view of the voice quality, where 1 means a bad 
quality, i.e., very annoying, and 5 means excellent 
quality, i.e., imperceptible quality impairment.  
4. Playout Loss rate: indicates the ratio of received 
late packets that miss their playout time to total 
packets received. Late packets are dropped.  
7.4 Simulation Results 
Fig. 2 shows the average packet delivery ratio achieved 
by each routing algorithm for the voice traffic. It can be 
noticed that the proposed S-AMCQ routing algorithm 
achieves higher packet delivery ratio than IAQR but less 
than AMCQ. Since the voice packets are small, only 40 
bytes, and voice traffic is reliability tolerant but delay in-
tolerant, the average delivery ratio increases when the 
network density increases because more options are 
available to compute feasible routes to the destination. 
However, the high packet delivery ratio does not mean 
the received voice traffic has high quality as described 
later in MOS and playout loss rate figures. Besides, the 
enhancement in PDR varies among the examined routing 
algorithms. Since the ACO rules are designed with vehic-
ular network topology dynamics in mind, ants are able to 
select and maintain feasible routes through dynamic cal-
culations of pheromone improvement and evaporation 
parameters. Using constant parameters as in IAQR does 
not allow the routing algorithm to benefit from 
knowledge of network changes, i.e., the network density. 
With regard to S-AMCQ, higher network density usually 
results in longer routes between the source and the desti-
nation vehicles, and the security overhead causes lower 
PDR in comparison to AMCQ.  
Fig. 3 shows how fast each routing algorithm can con-
verge and start data transmission, i.e., perform one route 
discovery process and compute a feasible route. The 
AMCQ and S-AMCQ routing algorithms are faster than 
IAQR in identifying feasible routes that satisfy the QoS 
constraints. This is due to the fact that the ACO rules are 
designed to consider the reliability of the traversed links. 
However, it can be seen that the security mechanisms 
overhead in S-AMCQ delays the route discovery process 
especially when the network density increases, which 
affects its PDR as showed in Fig. 2. Voice packets are 
transmitted with the added delay of the signing and veri-
fying processes that have taken place in S-AMCQ route 
discovery process. In the worst case, when the network 
density reaches 75 vehicles, the time overhead of the 
route discovery process in S-AMCQ is approximately 182 
ms. Suppose the source and the destination vehicles are 
moving in opposite directions at the highest velocities 
allowed on the highway, i.e., 80 km/h on average. After 
182 ms, both vehicles will have moved about 4.04 m away 
from each other, i.e., about 8.08 m in total. This number 
represents the distance difference that occurs because of 
the delay of S-AMCQ route discovery process. If the vehi-
cles are at the edge of their communication ranges, then 
  
the route is not going to be discovered, or it is going to 
disconnect before the beginning of data transmission. 
However, since different feasible routes are computed, 
this is not going to significantly affect the performance of 
S-AMCQ routing algorithm as shown above in Fig. 2.  
It can be noticed in Fig. 4 that MOS reduces for all 
routing algorithms when the number of vehicles increas-
es. This reduction comes from the fact that the feasible 
route connecting the source and the destination vehicles 
might be longer now, i.e., the number of hops could be 
higher when more vehicles are available in the network. 
The increased number of hops of the selected route affects 
the quality of the transmitted voice, and decreases its 
MOS value. However, the decrease in the MOS of IAQR is 
more rapid than that in the MOS of AMCQ and S-AMCQ 
routing algorithms. From this figure we can conclude that 
the security overhead may affect the delivered voice qual-
ity by approximately 0.16 in comparison to AMCQ. The 
delivered voice quality is between poor and fair in S-
AMCQ routing algorithm, i.e., its MOS value is between 
2.12 and 2.35. 
Finally, Fig. 5 shows that the Playout loss rate of each 
routing algorithm is linked with Fig. 4, which shows their 
MOSs. When the Playout loss rate increases, i.e., more 
voice packets are arriving late and missing their playout 
time, the MOS decreases. The reason behind the good 
MOS achieved by AMCQ and S-AMCQ is the lower Play-
out loss rate it exhibits in this figure. This means that S-
AMCQ has a higher success rate than IAQR in identifying 
feasible routes that deliver voice packets on time to the 
destination, even when the security mechanisms are ap-
plied. However, its Playout loss rate is higher than that of 
AMCQ because data packets could arrive late at the des-
tination vehicle because of the security mechanisms over-
head. As a result, some data packets might be discarded 
as they miss their playout time.  
8 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we utilise the ACO rules to propose a se-
cure ACO-based MCQ (S-AMCQ) routing algorithm for 
VANETs. The ACO rules are designed to consider the 
dynamics of the vehicular network topology. Moreover, 
we design the routing control ants to be easily secured 
using conventional security mechanisms such as digital 
signatures. To defend against internal adversaries, we 
developed plausibility checks for the S-AMCQ routing 
algorithm based on its design and an extended VANET-
oriented Evolving Graph (E-VoEG) model. Simulation 
results demonstrate that the security overhead of S-
AMCQ routing algorithm slightly affects its performance. 
However, S-AMCQ can still guarantee significant per-
formance in terms of identifying feasible routes, and de-
livering data packets in accordance with the required QoS 
constraints as shown for voice packets.  
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